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HE era of scientific fact-finding which originated in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
forced its conclusions into all fields of endeavor. The
first to feel and accept this growing force was the bar.
The justices and teachers of law realized that science
could help them in deciding weighty judicial questions.
This thought is clearly expressed in the introduction by
Dean Wigmore to Albert S. Osborn's book, Questioned
Documents! Dean Wigmore says in part:

A century ago the science of handwriting study did not
exist. A crude empiricism still prevailed. This hundred years
past has seen a vast progress. All relevant branches of modern
science have been brought to bear. Skilled students have
focused upon this field manifold appurtenant devices and
apparatus. A Science and an Art have developed. A firm

place has now been made for the expert witness who is
emphatically scientific, and not merely empiric.
Each age has its crimes, with the corresponding protective

measures,-all alike the product of the age's conditions. In
each age, crime takes advantage of conditions, and then society
awakes and gradually overtakes crime by discovering new
expedients.8

Perhaps the greatest aid science has made to law is in
its contribution of various forms of personal and posi1 Member Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 Second Edition, Boyd Printing Company, Albany, N. Y. 1929.

3 Questioned Documents, vii.
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tive identification, such as studies of X-rays, microscopes, microphones, means of identification of writing
and fingerprints. With the help of these devices, criminal
justice was enabled in overcoming one of its most serious
difficulties-inability of positive identification. This
article, as the title implies, deals with fingerprint evidence-what is said regarding it, however, applies
equally to the other forms of personal identification.
During the nineteenth century it was discovered that
the papillary ridges on the finger tips are studded with
small pores that exude perspiration in a continuous flow
which causes the finger to be constantly moist.4 Consequently, each time a smooth surface is touched, an
individual print is made.' The theory was advanced by
Sir Francis Galton that by drawing a straight line from
the center, or core, of the fingerprint to the divergent
ridges, or delta, and counting the ridges that crossed
this line, as well as dividing the various shapes of these
lines into set classes, one could form a system of identification practically perfect and unforgeable. He further
proved by experiment that these prints were permanent,
not changing from birth to death, nor then until the
period of decomposition; also, that the chances were
sixty-four billion to one against there being duplicate
fingerprints.!
The origin of this type of evidence is rather uncertain.
It is said that Egyptian monarchs had rings made, upon
the back of which were their thumb prints. These rings
were used upon all royal orders.' A second source of
information claims that the first known fingerprint is
preserved today in the British Museum on the Assyrian
4 Lee Seymour, Fingerprint Classification (The Author, Los Angeles,
1913) p. 80: Francis Galton, Finger Prints (Macmillan and Co., New
York, 1892) pp. 2, 57, 58.
5 Galton, Finger Prints, pp. 31, .168.
6 Galton, Finger Prints, p. 97.
7 Galton, Finger Prints, p. ]10. However, see Albert Wehde and John
Nicholas Beffel, Finger-Prints Can Be Forged (Tremonia Publishing Co.,
Chicago, 1924) p. 36.
8 People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 547.

FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE

Clay Tablets ;' while a third source claims that the Chinese used fingerprints as a means of identification as
early as the seventh century A. D. 10
From the date of origin to the nineteenth century, the
science of fingerprinting seems either to have been lost
or discarded. In 1823, Purkenje, later professor of Anatomy in the University of Breslau, submitted to that
institution for the degree of Doctor of Medicine a Latin
thesis dealing with the examination of the cutaneous
system." From that time on, fairly rapid strides were
made in the development of this re-discovered science.
During the eighteenth century the British government
was finding almost impossible the task of identifying the
large and illiterate population of India. One of the worst
evils was in the case of pensioners. When a pensioner
died, other natives appeared to draw his stipend, and
thus many were receiving an undeserved livelihood from
the government. In 1858, Sir William J. Herschel hit
upon the plan of identifying the natives by fingerprints.
Its success was immediate and rapidly became the sole
means of signature and identification used throughout
India for every purpose."
In 1892, Sir Francis Galton, whose works are still considered the greatest authority on fingerprints, published
his first book, which explained the various classifications
of prints and put each class into such form as to make
its use practicable. A young Argentine, Vucetich, (by
some credited with having preceded Galton in his experiments) worked out the present system and reduced the
classifications to a workable few."
From this time on a growing interest was shown by the
police departments of the various nations. The French
9 C. Ainsworth Mitchell, Science and the Criminal (Little Brown &
Co., Boston, 1911) p. 51.
10 Berthold Laufer, History of the Finger-Print System, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institute, 1912 (Government Printing Ofice,
Washington, 1913) p. 648.
11 C. Ainsworth Mitchell, The Expert Witness (D. Appleton & Co.,
New York, 1923) p. 38.
12 William J. Herschel, origin of Finger-Printing (Oxford University
Press, London, 1916) p. 9.
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police department adopted a system of fingerprints for
the detection of criminals about 1882. In 1901 the English metropolitan police, under Sir Edward R. Henry,
adopted a similar system. Sir Henry made possible a
central bureau and clearing house for keeping records of
prints taken. Today, the central bureau, Scotland Yards,
has what is considered the most complete criminal files
in the world."
The success of this new system of detection was widely
heralded and the examples of its results were so outstanding that they attracted the attention of the United
States government. A commission which was sent to
England to investigate returned with such a favorable
report that the war department established a bureau in
1891 for the detection of deserters.' 5
There is some controversy as to who started in this
country the fingerprint record as a means of identifying
criminals. Once it was introduced, however, it spread to
the police departments of the various cities, until today
every city of any size has an identification bureau, and
the United States government maintains a central bureau at Washington. Some states have passed laws
establishing state bureaus for identification records and
requiring that the police take fingerprints of every person arrested and send them to the state bureau." The
laws also state that these fingerprints may be used as
evidence upon trial of a case.
Further discussion of fingerprint evidence naturally
divides itself into four subtopics-first, admissability;
second, expert testimony; third, weight of evidence;
fourth, constitutionality.
No cases, apparently, are on record in which the admissability of fingerprint evidence is questioned. This type
13 People v. Sallow, 165 N. Y. S. 915.
14 Wehde & Beffel, Finger-Prints Can Be Forged, p. 27; Mitchell,
Science and the Criminal, p. 51 et seq.
15 Seymour, Fingerprint Classification, preface.
16 Compiled Laws of the State of Michigan 1915, Act 183, see. 1820;
New York Parole Act 1919, Ch. 659, see. 78. See Cal. L. Rev., Nov., 1919,
VIII, 25.
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of evidence is accepted chiefly on its scientific perfection
and its value to law because of its near infallability as a
means of identification. One of the British courts has
gone so far as to say that the reliability of fingerprint
evidence is such a soundly established fact that evidence
of the individuality of fingerprints is hardly required.17
The first case on record of the admission of fingerprint
evidence by the courts is the celebrated Thomas Herbert
Castleton's Case of England,18 decided in 1909, in which
the Lord Chief Justice held that fingerprint evidence was
admissible although it was the sole grounds of identification.
In the case of Parker v. The King, 9 the defendant
Parker was convicted by means of fingerprints found on
a bottle at the scene of the burglary. Chief Justice Griffith made the following statement in that decision:
Signatures have been accepted as evidence of identity as
long as they have been used. The fact of the individuality of
the corrugations of the skin on the fingers of the human hand
is now so generally recognized as to require very little, if any,
evidence of it, although it seems to be still the practice to
offer some expert evidence on the point. A fingerprint is
therefore in reality an unforgeable signature. That is now
recognized in a large part of the world, and in some parts has,
I think, been recognized for many centuries.
In three cases in India, the British courts again upheld
20
the previous opinions.
The first real recognition of fingerprints in this country was in the case of People v. Jennings,"' which was
handed down in December, 1911, and today is considered
one of the most outstanding cases on admission and
acceptance of fingerprint evidence. This decision is
17 Parker v. The King, 14 Commonwealth Law Rep. (Australia) 681.

18 3 Crim. App. Rep. 74.
19 14 Commonwealth Law Rep. (Australia) 681.
20 Emperor v. gahdio, I. L. R. 3 Nagpur Law Rep. 1; Emperor v. Abdul
Hamid, I. L. R. 32 Calcutta 759; Emperor v. Hulost, 7 Crim. Law Jour.
(India) 406.
21 252 1ll. 534.
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quoted in practically every case requiring a statement
on fingerprint evidence, and it is often found in textbooks
on the subject. In this decision Chief Justice Carter
said:
When photography was first introduced it was seriously
questioned whether pictures thus created could properly be
introduced in evidence, but this method of proof, as well as
by means of X-rays and the microscope, is now admitted without question. . . We are disposed to hold from the evidence
of the four [expert] witnesses who testified and from the
writings we have referred to on this subject, that there is a
scientific basis for the system of fingerprint identification and
that the courts are justified in admitting this class of evidence;
that this method of identification is in such general and common use that the courts cannot refuse to take judicial cognizance of it. Such evidence may or may not be of independent
strength, but is admissable, the same as other proof, as tending
to make out a case. If inferences as to the identity of persons
based on the voice, the appearance or age are admissable, why
does not this record justify the admission of this fingerprint
testimony under common law rules of evidence? The general
rule is that whatever tends to prove a material fact is relevani
and competent.
The Illinois case was followed four years later by two
cases setting forth the same contention. In one of these,
State v. Connors,2 this statement was made:
Of course the circumstances in different cases as they arise
cannot be expected to be alike, but the principle of law, once
settled as we conceive it to be . . ., determines the legal pro-

priety of admitting testimony of the same general character.
In the other decision given in the New York case of
People v. Roach.," Justice Seabury said:
In view of the progress that has been made by scientific
students and those charged with the detection of crime in the
police departments of the larger cities of the world, in effecting identification by means of fingerprint impressions, we can22 87 N. J. L. 419.
23 215 N. Y. 592.
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not rule as a matter of law that such evidence is incompetent.
Nor does the fact that it presents to the court novel questions
preclude its admission upon common-law principles. The same
thing was true of typewriting, photography, and X-ray photographs, and yet the reception of such evidence is a common

occurrence in our courts.
These decisions have been followed in rapid succession
by many others2 in none of which is found a single doubt
as to the admissability of fingerprint evidence. In fact,
the courts readily accept its help as a means of identification. Its acceptance by the courts is based on the recognition of the scientific foundation and perfection of this
system of identification.
A clear impression of the qualifications of a fingerprint
expert are given by Chief Justice Carter in People v.
Jennings," where he permitted comparisons of fingerprints to be made by witnesses, who for several years had
made a study of fingerprints in connection with detective
bureaus and had had actual experience in identifying
persons by that method.
The qualifying of an expert in this line is no different
from that in any other case requiring the testimony of
one skilled in a particular line of endeavor. The usual
line of questioning is as to where the witness received his
training qualifying him to act as an expert, also, the
number of prints he examines each day or week. Dean
Wigmore makes the following suggestion on the subject:
A witness expert in the subject [of fingerprints] must state
that the system of interpretation used by him in inferring
identity of marks was a system accepted in the profession.
There are several such systems; they differ chiefly in practical
convenience only.
The witness must further be able to state that the particular
marks used as a basis of inference were distinct and numerous
enough to afford an inference, under the system which he
24 Young & Griffin v. State, 68 Ala. 569; People v. Storrs, 207 N. Y.
247; State v. Kuhl, 42 Nev. 185; Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418; McGarry
v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. Rep. 597.
25 252 Il1. 534.
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employs; and also that the marks thus used for study were
reproduced or transferred by some reliable process
from the
2
original object on which they were impressed.
The thoroughness and certainty by which the expert is
shown to be qualified will greatly affect the weight given
to the testimony. The juryman has read that people can
be identified by fingerprints, and he knows that police
agencies employ these methods to apprehend criminals.
He knows nothing further, however. The attorney must
show the jury just how certain this particular expert can
be of his identification and why he can be so certain.
The prosecution in the case of State v. Moon" used an
excellent method for convincing the jury of the expert's
ability and the soundness of fingerprint evidence in proving identity. The fingerprint expert made two prints of
one finger of each of the jurymen and had them put into
a hat. Explaining to the jury as he proceeded just what
he was doing, he picked the prints out one at a time and
paired them properly within a few minutes. One can
readily imagine what weight the jury gave to his
testimony.
It is a rule of evidence that qhestions of admissibility
are for the courts to decide, but that questions regarding
the weight of testimony are for the jury to decide. The
foregoing discussion has shown that fingerprint evidence
and expert testimony have been held admissable by the
courts. The next step is to note what the courts have to
say about the weight to be given to all this testimony.
2 8 held that the
Justice Minturn, in State v. Cerciello,
court "quite properly" left to the jury determination of
the weight and importance as evidence of the testimony
of an expert witness. One is impressed with the fact that
in giving opinions, the courts seem to go out of their way
26 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (2d Ed.), sec. 414 (2) & (3).
27 22 Ariz. 418. This evidence was admitted over objection, and the
admission was later sustained by the upper court on the ground that it
merely explained the technique of a subject hard for the layman to
grasp.
28 86 N. J. L. 309. See also State v. Connors, 87 N. J. L. 419.

FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE

to emphasize that consideration of the weight of evidence
is entirely up to the jury.29
Emperor v. Abdul Hamid 0 presents an outstanding
example of this matter of leaving the judgment of the
weight of evidence to the jury. Here, the fingerprint impressions were badly blurred-so much so, that the
expert had difficulty in tracing the markings. The justice
set forth the statement that the evidence of the expert
was admissable but that it need not be a proving factor.
Just how much weight should be accorded such evidence
was entirely in the hands of the jury.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which sets forth that no man shall be required to
give evidence against himself, has been bodily incorporated into most of the state constitutions. It has been
claimed that forcing a man to make prints of his fingers
for the purpose of comparing them with the prints found
at the scene of the crime, is forcing him to give testimony
against himself.
It is well known that the first ten amendments to the
United States Constitution are considered applicable
only to the federal courts. This contention is clearly
stated in State v. Atkinson"' as follows:
In the first place, we do not understand that the limitations
imposed by the fourth and fifth amendments have any application to the powers of the state government, but apply only to

the powers of the federal government. As was said by Waite,
C. J. in Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. at page 166: "That the first

ten Articles of Amendment were not intended to limit the
powers of the state governments in respect to their own people,
but to operate on the National Government alone, was decided

more than a half century ago, and that decision has been
steadily adhered to since." Nor can it be said that the Fourteenth Amendment has had the effect of extending the operation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the States.
29 People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592; Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418; State
v. Kuhl, 42 Nev. 185; People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534,
30 I. L. R. 32 Calcutta 759.
31 40 S, C, 363,
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Since most states have similar sections in their constitutions, this phase of the question is comparatively unimportant. The origin of this privilege of not having
to testify against oneself was set forth in Brown v.

Walker :12
The maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, had its origin
in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust
methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long
obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of
the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection
of additional barriers for the protection of the people against
the exercise of arbitrary powers, was not uncommon even in
England.
In State v. Ah Chvuey" the following was said:
In the early history of England accused persons were compelled. to testify in answer to any criminal charge brought
against them. With the advancing spirit of the age it was
claimed that no man ought to be compelled to accuse himself
of any crime, and by degrees the rule was changed to its
present state in accordance with what seemed to be the public
sentiment of the country ....

It was .

.

. adopted to prevent

the evils which had resulted from the custom of other countries in compelling criminals to give evidence against themselves and of being "subjected to the rack or torture in order
to procure a confession of guilt," [unknown in England
according to Blackstone].
It is a recognized fact that in most cases a privilege
may be waived as long as the accused knows what he is
doing. The right to waive this privilege is upheld in
6 Cordes v.
State v. Zdanowicz,"4 Angeloff v. State,"
6
State, and State v. Jones." These opinions show that
the waiver of the privilege is recognized by the courts
32 161

U. S. 591.

33 14 Nev. 79.

34 69, N. J. L. 619.
35 91 Ohio St. 361.
3654 Tex. Crim. App. 204.

37 153 g4o. 460,
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and that the defendant may give evidence that might tend
to convict him.
Forcing the accused to make fingerprints is widely
believed to be unconstitutional. In principle, however, it
should not be so considered, and the decisions in cases
concerned with the admissibility of other evidence obtained without the accused's consent would warrant a
deduction that the same reasoning would apply where the
evidence is fingerprints. Dean Wigmore offers a very
lucid explanation of the limitation of the privilege. He
says:
The limit of the privilege is a plain one. From the general
principle it results that an inspection of the bodily features

by the tribunal or by witnesses cannot violate the privilege,
because it does not call upon the accused as a witness, i. e. upon
his testimonial responsibility. That he may in such cases be
required sometimes to exercise muscular action-as when he
is required to take off his shoes or roll up his sleeve-is immaterial, unless all bodily action were synonymous with testimonial utterance; for, as already observed, not compulsion
alone is the component idea of the privilege, but testimonial
compulsion. What is obtained from the accused by such action
is not testimony about his body, but his body itself. Unless
some attempt is made to secure a communication, written or
oral, upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind in
expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial
one. Moreover, the main object of the privilege is to force
prosecuting officers to go out and search and obtain all the
extrinsic available evidence of an offense, without relying
upon the accused's admissions. Now in the case of the person's
body, its marks and traits, itself is the main evidence; there
is ordinarily no other or better evidence available for the
prosecutor. Hence, the main reason for the privilege loses its
force.38

In the case of State v. Ah Chuey,9 Justice Hawley
38 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (2d Ed.), sec. 2265.
39 14 Nev. 79.
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gives an explanation of why fingerprints and comparable
things could not come under the constitutional privilege.
Confessions of persons accused of crime, whenever obtained
by the influence of hope or fear, are excluded because in considering the motives which actuate the mind of man they
might be induced to make a false statement....
In a case of homicide the defendant makes evidence against
himself by being compelled to surrender the weapon with
which the offense was committed, for it can always be used as
evidence against him. A burglar is compelled to give evidence
against himself when he is forced to surrender false keys and
other burglarious instruments found in his possession. A
counterfeiter is compelled to give evidence against himself
when the dies he had manufactured and used are discovered
and brought into court for inspection.
From whatever standpoint this question can be considered,
the truth forces itself upon my mind that no evidence of physical facts can, upon any established principle of law, or upon
any substantial reason, be held to come within the letter or
spirit of the constitution ...
Under the law, as it existed for many years in the several
states, a defendant was not allowed to testify in his own behalf. If the principle contended for by the appellant is correct, Parker ought not to have been allowed to exhibit his feet
to the jury, because this was allowing him to make evidence
in his own behalf. Would any court in christendom, in construing such a law, refuse to allow the defendant to establish
a fact in his own favor in the manner allowed in Parker's
case?
Let us try by comparison now to see what this privilege
really is. It has been held generally that the defendant
may be required to stand up for the purpose of identification. 0 In State v. Prudhomme et al.,"' it was held to be
no violation of constitutional rights to require the defendant to place his feet in such a position that they
might be seen by the jury and the witnesses who might
40State v. Reasby, 100 Iowa 231; People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328;
Parker v. State, 183 Ind. 130.
41 25 La. Ann. 522.
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testify as to the comparison of the defendant's shoes
with the tracks found near the scene of the murder.
The courts have frequently affirmed the power to take,
preserve, and make reasonable use of data for the identification of persons accused of crime. In People v. Van
Wormer," the court held that when the shoes of the defendants were taken and placed in the tracks found near
the scene of the murder, it was permissible and not in
contravention of any constitutional right. The court
cited People v. Gardner' as its authority. This rule permitting the introduction of evidence concerning footprints which the defendant had been required to make,
or which had been made from the shoes taken from him
for the purpose of comparison, has been applied in various cases. 4 State v. Graham45 gives the following
opinion:
If an officer who arrests one charged with an offense had no
right to make the prisoner show the contents of his pocket,
how could the broken knife, or the fragment of paper corresponding to the wadding, have been found? If, when a prisoner is arrested for passing counterfeit money, the contents of
his pockets are sacred from search, how can it ever appear
whether or not he has on his person a large number of similar
bills, which, if proved, is certainly evidence of the scienter?
If an officer sees a pistol projecting from the pocket of a prisoner arrested for a fresh murder, may he not take out the
pistol against the prisoner's consent, to see whether it appears
to have been recently discharged? Suppose it be a question as
to the identity of the prisoner, whether [it be] a person whom
a witness says he saw commit a murder, and the prisoner
appears in court with a veil or mask over his face: may not
the court order its removal in order that the witness may say
whether or not he was the person whom he saw commit the
crime ?
42 175 N. Y. 188.
43 144 N. Y. 119.
44 Thornton v. State, 117 Wis. 338; State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506:
Morris v. State, 124 Ala. 44; State v. Puller, 34 Mont. 12; Carlton v.
People, 150 Ill. 181.
45 74 N. C. 646.
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A photograph which was taken against the will of the
accused was allowed as evidence in the case of Shaffer v.
United States." Here, a witness had seen the defendant
commit the crime and might have recognized him again
had he not grown a beard since the time of the crime. A
photograph taken at the time of arrest was introduced
and identified but was objected to on the grounds of "involuntary evidence against defendant." The court said:
In taking and using the photograph there was no violation
of any constitutional right. There is no pretense that there
was any excessive force or illegal duress employed by the
officer in taking the picture. We know that it is the daily
practice of police to use photographic pictures for the discovery and identification of criminals, and without such a
means many criminals would escape detection or identification.
In a case where there was evidence admitted which had
been obtained by forcing the defendant to put his foot
into a box of ashes and sand in order to compare the
foot print with those found at the scene of the crime, the
judge said:
We think that officers having a prisoner in custody have a
right to acquire information about him, even by force and
that, for example, when his photograph is taken or his measurements taken, it is simply the act of the officers and is not
47
compelling him to give evidence against himself.
This view is sustained in civil cases in which the controversies concern the right of officers to take measurements for police records." In these civil cases we get a
different type of opinion, but all hold that police have the
right to use all reasonable means for the suppression of
crime, and fingerprinting a man is considered reasonable
as a police power.
Chief Justice Magie in State v. Miller " held that when
a man had wounds on his body which were examined in
46 24 App. D. C. 417 (Certiorari denied 196 U. S. 639).
47 United States v. Cross, 20 D. C. 365.
48Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11; Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 703; Crowley v. Christensen, 137
U. S. 86.
49 71 N. J. L. 527.
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prison by a doctor who testified as a witness on the trial,
this was not forcing the man to give evidence against
himself." It has been held not to be giving evidence
against oneself when the fingerprints were made upon
a special blotter by getting the defendant to sign his
name at which time he made an impression on the blotter, of his fingerprints."'
Before concluding this section, the opinion of Justice
Earl in the case of People v. Gardner" can be used to
state again the purpose of the constitutional provision:
The main purpose of the provision was to prohibit the compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial,
for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in crime. . . A murderer may be
forcibly taken before his dying victim for identification, and
the dying declarations of his victim may then be proved upon
his trial for his identification. A thief may be forcibly examined, and the stolen property may be taken from his person
and brought into court for his identification. A prisoner's
person may be examined for marks and bruises, and then they
may be proved upon his trial to establish his guilt; and it
would be stretching the constitutional inhibition too far to
make it cover such cases, and cases like this, and the inhibition
thus applied would greatly embarrass the administration of
justice.
In all of these cases cited it has been held that the defendants' constitutional right was not violated. This
study brings us to an idea that is expressed by Justice
Holmes in Holt v. United States:" "Another objection is
based upon an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment." Justice Holmes has really sounded the keynote
of the whole point. The Fifth Amendment and various
state paragraphs were set up originally with the purpose
in mind of allowing a privilege, but this matter has been
50
Mo.
51
52
53

See also O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38 and State v. Tettaton, 159
354.
State v. Cereiello, 86 N. J. L. 309.
144 N. Y. 119.
218 U. S. 245.

246
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so extended today that the courts find themselves fighting this so called privilege and its extension rather than
upholding it.
In summarizing, one concludes, from the list of cases
cited, that the courts universally accept the admissability
of finger print evidence and welcome the assistance experts give in deciphering the evidence, although they are
careful to instruct the juries that the matter of weight to
be given this evidence is entirely up to them, the jury.
The final conclusion is that the acceptance and use of this
type of evidence is absolutely not unconstitutional.

